

# **Pew Research Center**

## **The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era**

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*Edited Transcript*

### **Welcome**

*Andrew Kohut,*  
President,  
Pew Research Center

### **Presentation of Findings**

*Paul Taylor,*  
Executive Vice President,  
Pew Research Center

### **Panel Discussion**

*Rick Atkinson,*  
Journalist and Author  
(Moderator)

*Retired Army Colonel Charles D. Allen*

*Peter Mansoor,*  
General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair of Military History,  
Ohio State University

*Vivian Greentree,*  
Director of Research and Policy,  
Blue Star Families

*David R. Segal,*  
Director,  
Center for Research on Military Organization, University of Maryland

**ANDREW KOHUT:** Welcome. I'm Andy Kohut. I'm the president of the Pew Research Center. What a wonderful turnout. You'd think we were talking about Amanda Knox today with a crowd like this. (Laughter.)

Now, seriously, I want to welcome you to the unveiling of the findings of the Pew Research Center surveys among the nation's veterans and the general public, which explored attitudes towards the war, sacrifice and burden-sharing.

I think what we will hear today will probably confirm some notions that you have about the subject and maybe raise some doubts about some others. But more than anything else, it's my hope and expectation that you're going to find that our polling sheds new light on this important chapter in our nation's history.

But before going any further, I'd like to acknowledge Rebecca Rimel, president and CEO of the Pew Charitable Trust, my boss. It's with her support and encourage we get to do work like this. Thank you, Rebecca, so much.

Without further ado I'm going to turn things over to Paul Taylor, executive vice president of the Pew Research Center. He conceived of this study. He led the team that carried out this very ambitious project. And he's going to tell you what the top of the story is. Thank you.

Paul?

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Thank you, Andy. Thank you, Rebecca. Welcome, everybody. Thank you for coming.

I'm going to speak for 15 minutes or so, walking you through some of the highlights of these surveys. I hope that will be a long enough filibuster so by the time that I'm done we'll be able to bring on this very distinguished panel, who will have what I hope will be a very illuminating conversation about some of the themes and topics that we've covered in our report.

Five days ago Mike Mullen retired after a distinguished 43-year career in the Navy. He retired, as you know, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And in his waning months he gave – I guess you would call some valedictory addresses. One of them was this past spring to the West Point graduating class. And he said, on the topic of the military-civilian divide, "I fear they do not know us. I fear they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay when we return from battle."

Secretary Gates, who also recently retired, has sounded this theme a lot in recent years, as have many civilian leaders. This is actually a theme that runs throughout history. As I think you'll hear from the panel, this is not – this issue of this divide is not new. It's been with us since the earliest days of the republic. But it does resonate in a special way in the modern era, and this line chart gives you a sense of why.

Here we are, 110-year history here starting from 1900 carried forward to the present day. The share of the U.S. population on active (duty) – serving in the armed forces at any given time – and you see through our history of the last century it spikes during periods of war – World War

II, the largest fight, and nearly 9 percent of the population was in the armed forces during World War II.

There are other spikes, lower spikes for other wars. But if you go to the far right of this chart, we've been at war for the last decade and there is no spike. We are at about ½ of 1 percent of our population currently in the military. This is the lowest share since the peacetime – since the period between World War I and World War II. The difference, of course, is that was a time of peace and this is a time of war.

And that's what distinctive about this period. It's the longest war in our history – we're about to celebrate the 10<sup>th</sup> mark – I should say the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the launch of this war – and it has been fought by the smallest share of our population in any wartime situation.

So this is in part a pretext and a premise for some of the themes we want to explore, but it is also a challenge for us. We are a survey research organization. We do scientific surveys, which means we want to get random samples and weight them to full populations to be able to claim that the people we spoke to are a representative sample of a given universe. Well, the given universe of veterans of the post-9/11 wars is about 4 million in a country of 312 million. That's slightly over 1 percent of the population, so finding them is a bit of a needle-in-a-haystack proposition.

And how did we do it? I guess for this audience you could say we applied the Powell doctrine and brought it to surveyed research. We just threw a whole lot of force at the issue. We are a polling organization and we have a lot of relationships with polling vendors, who are in the field all the time.

And, starting about six months ago, we asked them, in whatever surveys they were doing, just ask one screener question: Is there a veteran in your household? We don't do the interview now; we just want to harvest these names.

We did that for six months. Over the course of six months these vendors contacted about 54,000 households. They got some of them saying, yes, there is a veteran, and then we were ready to do the survey. We recontacted those who said they had a veteran. So that got us to 1,853 veterans of all eras, including 712 who had served on active duty in the last decade. We did the interviews late summer, as you can see.

We also did, at the same time, a national separate survey of a national sample of adults in this country, 2,000 of them. And with both surveys, once we got the responses, we do what we do, and all polling organizations do: We weighted the results so that it would be – it would be attached to what we know about the universe of veterans. We know from the census what veterans look like in terms of their age, in terms of their socioeconomic status, their race, their ethnicity.

So, polling is an imperfect science, but it is a science. We have margins of error. There are other dioceses that may be introduced, but we're comfortable presenting these findings and speaking for the universe of all veterans, the universe of post-9/11 veterans, and indeed the general public.

OK, so what did we find? Well, we asked veterans a lot of different questions, and we asked to talk about the rewards of service. And you see the numbers here. We're in the survey business. We don't see 96 percent numbers about almost anything. Does your mother love you? I'm not sure we'd get 96 percent. (Laughter.)

These veterans, 96 percent of them say: "Were you proud of having served in this era?" "Yes." "Did it help you in other ways?" And you can see the very high numbers there including, "Did it prepare you for a job or a career?" Seventy-two percent say that, even though these veterans, as we all know, are struggling as they've come home, and one of their struggles is in finding jobs.

We also asked about some of the burdens. And, as we know, the most grievous burdens that any warrior faces is going to be on the battlefield. In this past decade we've lost 6,200 fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 46,000 wounded.

But there are also battle scars that are invisible, and we have some rundown of what these folks feel as they've returned home. About half say strains in family relations, frequently irritable or angry. Forty-four percent say they've had trouble re-entering civilian life. When we asked similar questions of pre-9/11 veterans, only 25 percent say they have had trouble re-entering civilian life. So there's an interesting gap there.

And then 37 percent say – and the question was, "Whether or not you've been official diagnosed, have you suffered from post-traumatic stress" – and 37 percent of these post-9/11 veterans say that they have.

Our sample of post-9/11 veterans, as I mentioned, was about 712, of whom about 60 percent – exactly 60 percent, I think, about 430 – actually served in combat or in a combat zone. And when we look at the differences between whether you're in a combat zone or whether you weren't, we see some pretty significant differences on all of these sort of burdens that these returning veterans are carrying.

I think the differences speak for themselves but, clearly, having been in combat is correlated, very highly correlated, with more of the problems, more of the lingering impacts of having served.

Post-traumatic stress, we're able to compare the answers to that question among post-9/11 veterans, those who were in the Vietnam era, the post-Vietnam era, going all the way back to the Korean era.

We have – by the way, I think all of you have this very long report. It's got a lot in it, including a 21-page description of our methodology. I recommend it to those of you who were looking to fall asleep, and I recommend it to those of you who want to get an advanced degree in public opinion survey research. (Chuckles.)

We find a very significant difference on post-traumatic stress between pre-9/11 veterans and post-9/11 veterans. Those two bars at the bottom – you know, you're 2 ½ times more likely, if you served in this modern era, to say you suffered from post-traumatic stress than if you served in earlier eras.

I would be cautious about this. There are possible explanations other than there were real differences. It is possible that post-traumatic stress is a phrase, is a topic, is a description that is in wider use now than it was in earlier eras. We know from literature, we know from history that warriors coming home from battle always have problems.

So, possibly some of it is just calling it by a new name. We have a finding in this survey: The modern-era veterans say that they are in a military climate where they are more comfortable talking about their emotional or psychological problems with their superiors than earlier era veterans are. So, possibly it's just you're more comfortable talking about it. And, frankly, possibly it's because the memories of the modern-era veterans are fresher than the memories of older-era veterans. So, big differences. Interpret them with caution.

We also asked the post-9/11 veterans about the two wars that most of them have been engaged in. And this was a "has it been worth it" question, not has it been worth it to you? But the question was, "Considering all the benefits to the United States versus the costs to the United States," we asked, "has the war in Afghanistan been worth it?" And about half of the post-9/11 veterans say yes. We asked, "Has the war in Iraq been worth it?" Forty-four percent say yes.

These levels are higher than the equivalent levels of the general public. Nonetheless, they don't represent, on the part of the warriors who fought these wars, an overwhelming endorsement of the worth of them. Indeed, if you aggregate the response of the post-9/11 veterans to those two questions, you find you have a 1/3-1/3 split. Among post-9/11 veterans, about a third say both have been worth it. About a third say neither has been worth it. And about a third say one but not the other, or I don't know; not my issue.

All right, let's change focus a little bit and look at some of the questions we asked of the general population. And here again you get a 91 percent. We don't see numbers like that very often: "Does the general public feel proud of the soldiers serving in the military? Ninety-one percent say yes. "Have you thanked someone for their service?" Three-quarters say yes. "Have you done something to help a member of the military or someone in their family? Nearly six in 10 say yes.

So this is a public that is deeply appreciative of the military. And, by the way, it's not just the troops and the warriors and their families that they're appreciative of. They are very, very appreciative of and confident in the institution of the military.

So, here is a 40-year line chart. It's Confidence in Institutions. The military is at the top of the charts, having risen over the course of these 40 years. I'm just showing you the lines for four institutions. In fact, this battery asks about 16 different institutions, and the military is number one against all 16.

I would take you back to the early 1970s, and let's take a look at the difference between two institutions here. Back then, the military – confidence in Congress was, it looks like, in the low 40s, and in the military back then was in the high 50s. So military is more confident but not a huge gap.

Let's move forward and see where we are today. Congress is at 12 percent. Reading the headlines of recent months, some of us want to ask, what are those 12 percent thinking? Haven't they been paying attention? (Laughter.)

But nonetheless, it is among the lowest rates that we've seen on this on this question. And the military is at nearly 80 percent, despite the fact that, remember, the majority of the public doesn't approve of the wars that this military has been fighting for the last decade. So this is a pretty profound endorsement of confidence.

This question harks back to the proposition that Admiral Mullen's quote puts on the table: Does the public really get what serving in the military is all about? And post-9/11 veterans say no, by overwhelming numbers. So do pre-9/11 veterans. And so did 10 percent of the public. There is an acknowledgement that we don't really fully understand what those in the military go through.

Then we asked another question, and this we asked to the general public. We said, "In the decade since the terrorist attacks of 9/11" – we asked back-to-back questions – "do you think members of the military and their families have had to make a lot of sacrifices?" Eighty-three percent say yes. "Do you think the American people have had to make a lot of sacrifices?" Forty-three percent say yes.

So there is a gap, a pretty significant gap, and among those who acknowledge that gap we then asked the follow-up question: "Is the fact that military and their families are bearing a greater share of the burdens and the sacrifices, is that unfair in any way, or is it just part of being in the military?" And according to the public, well, about a quarter of the public says, no, there's something unfair about that, but 7 in 10 say it's just part of being in the military.

This is the final slide I'm going to show, and it is a question – identical question we asked of both our veterans and the general public. And it was, "Would you advise a young person close to you to join the military or not?" And again you see the post-9/11 veterans who, remember, many of whom are struggling as they have re-entered civilian life. So they – but still, you know, in very, very large numbers they say yes. Pre-9/11 veterans say yes in slightly – still very large numbers, not quite as high.

And the general public on this is mixed. And here I would say that the tension between all of these responses, knowing what we know from other responses, is sort of interesting. Again, this is a general public that is very proud of the soldiers, that believes that the military as an institution is about the best institution in the country in terms of their confidence, but only half would advise a young person close to them to join. At some level I'm sure it's an acknowledgement that this is very dangerous work. Everybody sort of gets that.

If we look inside the general public on this question, we do see some interesting patterns. If you have a family member who has served in the military, you're more likely than others to say yes. Frankly, there's a political and ideological correlation here. If you are a Republican; if you are a self-described conservative, you're more likely to recommend this career. And we also see that, by the way, in our survey of veterans, who skew more Republican and more conservative than does the general population.

There's a lot more in this report. It goes on for many pages. We are able to cover a broader range of issues. We asked about nation-building. We asked about drones. We asked about the draft. We asked about the efficiency of the military, the fog of war, did soldiers and troops understand what they were doing? And because we have a large enough sample size, we are able to look at a lot of these responses across different service branches, whether or not you were in combat or not, by rank – generally speaking, by rank.

And a lot of these, it's the noncommissioned officers – the corporals, the sergeants, those who have sort of led men and women in battle, into firefighters who are the most supportive of the wars, the most enthusiastic about the experience, even more so than the enlisted troops. Of course they're quite supportive of the experience as well, and more so than some of the commissioned officers.

So there's a lot here. We ourselves plan to issue six more reports that will look at specific aspects of this. And then, as we always do with major reports like this, at some point we will make this data available to scholars, because I think there's a lot of learning that can be done here.

I hope I've gotten – have I gotten us through the main course? All right, we are now ready for I hope what will be a highlight of this luncheon, which is a wonderful panel. Let me invite the panelists to come on up, and I will introduce our moderator, and Rick will take over the introductions of our members of the panel. They will discuss some of the themes and some of the issues, and then I hope at some point Rick will leave time for questions from the audience.

It's a little bit daunting to introduce Rick Atkinson. About half a lifetime ago, Rick and I were young reporters together, or nearly-young reporters together, at the Washington Post. The Washington Post back then was a wonderful place to work. It was full of big talent and big egos. Ben Bradlee had a phrase called "creative tension." He liked to see those egos and that talent bounce around.

It didn't take me too long to notice that there was a quiet guy sort of at the other end of the newsroom that was better and smarter and faster than all of us at anything and everything he did, whether it was an investigative piece, whether it was writing a complicated lead-all on deadline where you had 10 different correspondents sending you stuff, in this case in the first Gulf War, and having to do it accurately and quick.

Rick has had an extraordinary career as a journalist. Even though he was pretty young when he got to the Washington Post, he already had, at that stage of his career, two Pulitzers under his belt, both of them at the Kansas City Times. And at the Washington Post he was part of another Pulitzer Prize-winning effort. So that's three.

And then about 20 years ago, despite his extraordinary gifts for the craft of journalism, he migrated out towards book-writing, and he's become one of the nation's leading military historians. He is two-thirds of the way through a trilogy on World War II, the first volume of which won yet another Pulitzer Prize, "An Army at Dawn."

And in the midst of this, five or six years ago he spent time – several months – with the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division in Iraq, which led to some wonderful articles in the Post and yet another book, “In the Company of Soldiers.”

Rick is a man for all seasons. It’s a pleasure to have you, and I look forward to hearing the discussion. (Applause.)

**RICK ATKINSON:** Thank you, Paul. Thanks very much.

Good afternoon. Thanks for being here with us this afternoon.

The relationship between our republic and our military is the oldest institutional relationship in our national history. And the Pew Research findings vividly highlight questions and issues that have risen repeatedly over the past 236 years – questions about the burden sharing by the body politic, about the sort of military we think a political democracy should have, about the extent to which the American military is too isolated from American society, a conundrum that’s been kicking around for two centuries.

These survey results, in effect, punctuate a point made by Admiral Mullen, as Paul mentioned, and Mullen said it last week, the day before he retired. He acknowledged the extent to which he frets over the extent to which the military has become a separate tribe in the republic, and that Americans, in his words, “don’t know the depth and the breadth of what we’ve been through: the numbers of deployments, the stress on the force, the suicide issues, the extraordinary performance.” And at West Point, as Paul mentioned, he boiled it down to simple, “I fear they do not know us.”

This anxiety about a civil-military gap is an ancient theme in our history. Beginning early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Army was sufficiently isolated from the rest of American life to sometimes resemble a monastic order, as the historian Russell Weigley once wrote, both physically isolated on far-flung posts and in far-flung brushfire wars, and isolated still more in mind and spirit.

In 1930, 12 years after America’s exit from one world war and 11 years before our entry into another, Congress created a War Policies Commission to consider policies to be pursued in the event of war on how to equalize the burdens and minimize the profits of war.

The commission was to study amending the Constitution in an effort somehow to require everyone to bear the burdens of war equally. Some believed, for example, that if men and property were at risk of being conscripted under national mobilization, that would reduce the campaigning by vested interests for U.S. entry into a war.

The commission included six Cabinet secretaries and eight members of Congress. The War Department point man in dealing with a commission whose hearings were held in 1931 was a 40-year-old major named Dwight David Eisenhower.

Not much came of this in the grand tradition of blue ribbon commissions. The Hoover administration, in 1931, was occupied with other pressing matters, and the incoming Roosevelt administration two years later had its own priorities.

The experience did provide Eisenhower with his initial introduction to what he would later call the military industrial complex, but how far we have come in 80 years from a time when shared sacrifice and wartime was a concept that many hoped to enshrine in the Constitution.

As it turned out, for the next war no amendment was necessary, and World War II, 16 million Americans served in uniform in a country of about 140 million. Almost everyone had someone they loved in harm's way. Everyone had skin in the game. Today we have about a million-and-a-half currently on active duty, plus 854,000 in the Selective Reserve in a country of 312 million. Relatively few have skin in the game.

The Pew survey shows that half of Americans believe the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had little impact on their lives. Only one-quarter are paying close attention to the wars. Yes, we're proud of them. Yes, we admire them. The survey certainly confirms that, but how deep does that go?

Elizabeth Samet, who teaches English at West Point, recently wrote that the phrase "thank you for your service," uttered to those in uniform, has become what she calls "an obligatory salutation, a mantra of atonement." She suggests that substance has been eclipsed by mechanical ritual. After the engagement, both parties retreat to separate camps without a significant exchange of ideas or perspectives having passed between them.

"Those superficial exchanges, however genuine, are a poor substitute for something more difficult and painful," says Professor Samet, "a conversation about what war does to the people who serve and to the people who don't." This afternoon we're going to have that conversation.

Our four panelists – and I will introduce them in alphabetical order – have a lot of experience in this field. And we'll start with me putting some questions to them but then we'll open it up to questions from the floor.

First, retired Army Colonel Charles D. Allen is the professor of leadership in cultural studies in the Department of Command Leadership and Management at the U.S. Army War College. Chuck recently ended a 30-year Army career as director of leader development. He also served as an instructor and assistant professor of engineering management at West Point.

He is a 1978 graduate of West Point. He had 11 years of overseas assignments in Germany, Honduras and South Korea. His military education also includes the Army War College, the Command General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the U.S. Army War College. Chuck has served in leadership and staff positions from platoon through corps in Army and joint commands, and he's also got extensive experience with the National Guard.

Vivian Greentree is the director of research and policy for Blue Star Families, a group founded by military spouses with the mission of raising awareness of the challenges of military family life. She's a Navy veteran, she's a military spouse, and she's currently writing her dissertation for her Ph.D. in public administration and urban policy, where her areas of public policy research include civic engagement and public service motivation. She's also a contributing writer to several military print and online outlets, and she's been asked for input and analysis for articles in both civilian and military media outlets.

Peter Mansoor is the General Raymond D. Mason, Jr. chair of military history at Ohio State University. The retired Army colonel ended a 26-year career as the executive officer to General David H. Petraeus. You've heard of him. He was then the commanding general of Multinational Force Iraq.

Pete was a 1982 distinguished graduate at West Point, and he served in a variety of command and staff positions in the U.S., Europe and the Middle East during his military career. From 2003 to 2005 he commanded the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade of the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, including 13 months of counterinsurgency duty in Iraq. He served as the founding director of the U.S. Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. And in the fall of 2006 he served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Council of Colonels that re-examined the strategy for the war in Iraq.

And, finally, David R. Segal. He's a professor of sociology, director of the Center for Research on Military Organization, and faculty affiliate in the Department of Government and Politics at the School of Public Affairs and Maryland Population Research Center. All of those are at the University of Maryland.

His visiting appointments include guest scientists at Walter Reed, distinguished lecturer and distinguished visiting professor at West Point, and the S.L.A. Marshall Chair at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. He's won numerous professional and teaching awards and has twice been awarded the Department of the Army Medal for Outstanding Civilian Service. That was in '89 and in 2000. And his public service includes special assistant for peace operations to the U.S. Army chief of staff in 1994 to '96, and two terms on the Board of Visitors, the U.S. Army War College.

Whew. There's more – (laughter) – on them in the information booklets you've been handed.

Well, let's start with you, David, since we introduced you last. More than eight in 10 of the post-9/11 veterans, 84 percent in fact, in this Pew survey say the American public has little or no understanding of the problems faced by those in the military, and a large majority of that public agrees. Does this seem fundamentally different to you from earlier generations of veterans? And if so, why?

**DAVID SEGAL:** The fundamental difference, I believe, is not between veterans of the current wars versus earlier veterans so much as it's a reflection of the difference between having a conscription-based Army and an all-volunteer force. In our surveys we began to see the change starting in the early 1970s, because of, I think, two major differences in the two kinds of forces.

First of all, the previous conscription-based Army during the Cold War was a larger force, and it was therefore a more visible presence in American society. Secondly, because it was based on conscription, there was a constant flow of young people coming out of our communities, out of our families into the military, and then returning back to their civilian communities.

With the advent of the all-volunteer force, we have fewer people serving. Those who serve, serve longer. They're not as quick to return to the civilian community. And they are, therefore, not as visible. There are basically fewer of them. There's also less of sense of understanding of what the military does, and I think matched with the sense that people don't know. I was very,

very reassured to find that Americans said they don't understand what's going on with the military.

When I first got into this business – and I got into this business before we had an all-volunteer force – when civilians were asked if they understood what the military does, their image was not only the Cold War but the two mid-century wars, when the image of the soldier was an infantryman, technology wasn't very complex, and they kind of had an understanding of what soldiers did.

Now they read about drones. Well, what are drones and what is the role of soldiers in flying drones? And how many soldiers are infantrymen? And, particularly, given the nature of the current wars and the change in warfare from conventional wars to fighting insurrections and counterinsurgency, certainly the older generation grew up thinking about conventional battlefields with the forward edge of the battle area. And soldiers are there and there are soldiers in rear areas and, gee, we get that.

And to understand the war where once you put your boots on the ground you are in the battle zone, that doesn't fit the old paradigm. So they know that the paradigm has changed. I think they don't understand what the change has been. So there have been, I think, two important inflection points.

One was the change from conscription to a volunteer force back in 1973, '74. And the second, the change from conventional warfare – which we really – we experienced that change in Vietnam but didn't acknowledge it, and in fact elected not to learn the lessons of Vietnam and had to relearn them in the current conflicts. But they now know that the nature of warfare has changed, and they know that they don't know what is involved.

**ATKINSON:** Can you add to that, Pete?

**PETER MANSOOR:** I'd like to kind of add a historical viewpoint, because before we say that there's this huge gap between the military and the civilians and the republic is going to collapse, I think it bears looking back at our own history.

The draft is an anomaly in American history: 1863 to 1865, three years; 1917, 1981, two years; 1940 to 1973, 34 years. You add all that up, that's 39 years. You subtract the number of years our republic has been in existence and you end up with 196 years that we relied on volunteers to staff our military and to fight our wars, to include some very lengthy wars in the Philippine Islands, to include the Moro Uprising afterwards, after the Philippine insurrection; the Indian wars of the American West, which Rick talked about up front.

So, what we're going through may seem new to us but it's not new to Americans. And what I think is we are reverting to more of the norm of American history, which is a reliance on a long-serving volunteer force, and I don't think it signals any sort of collapse of the American republic.

**ATKINSON:** Vivian, let me ask you a really fundamental question: Does the inequity of shared sacrifice matter? I mean, we see in the survey results that even if more than 4 in 5 Americans acknowledge that the sacrifice borne by the military and their families since 9/11 – only 1 in 4

describe that as unfair. And a substantial majority – 70 percent, in fact, say it is just part of being in the military. What does this tell us about the civil-military structure that we've built?

**VIVIAN GREENTREE:** That we've built. Well, I would say, yes, it does matter inasmuch that we value public service in general outside of the military, and public service of any kind. We risk, as Admiral Mullen said, "othering" each other. I fear that they don't understand us.

Blue Star Families did a survey of military families last year, and 92 percent of the respondents agreed that the general public doesn't understand or appreciate the unique challenges faced by modern-day military families.

And so, I think that it is there. It was interesting to me to see that the public also said the same thing, because what we were interpreting was thinking that the civilian community would largely say, yes, you know, of course we support the military, and 91 percent said they had.

But then when you look at the stair step down, what's the next thing from appreciating the service member? Then you maybe say thank you, but have you done anything? The next stair steps down lower. So I do wonder how much of it is saying they're appreciative but then not wanting their children to join the military.

**ATKINSON:** Chuck, does it matter – inequity?

**CHARLES ALLEN:** I think it does matter. Again, we say the military should represent the population which it serves. When you have disconnection between those who serve and those that they serve, then that may be a problem.

I know we have a representative here from the VA that talks about, I think, 400,000-plus veterans are under the VA care; 318 or so thousand receive disability allotments. So that's a big bill to pay, right? We're talking about changes in our economy, constraints on maybe some resourcing. We've got to pay this bill sometime, and if it's a challenge on paying to care for vets who are not part of society because they chose to do it on their own, that may be an issue for us to address.

**ATKINSON:** I know you have something to say, Colonel.

**MANSOOR:** I want to take issue with this disconnect, that somehow Americans don't know about the military. Page 66 of this study had a really astounding figure that – you know, I would never have guessed these numbers.

But the question is, how many – what's the percentage of the public who have friends and family who are veterans? Those who have a close friend or family member who has served in Iraq or Afghanistan: 57 percent. Those who have an immediate family member who is a veteran from any era: 61 percent. Those who have a more distant relative – and we're talking like cousins and uncles now – who are veterans from any era: 79 percent.

I don't think those numbers show a disconnect at all. And so I would just take exception that somehow there's this growing gap between the military and the American society.

**ATKINSON:** Well, then how do you square the circle of people in overwhelming numbers saying that they don't understand the military? They concede that they don't know that world.

**MANSOOR:** Well, they don't. They haven't walked in our shoes. They haven't served in uniform. They might know someone in uniform but then maybe they haven't talked to them at length about what it means to move around 17 times in 26 years, which is what I did, and have your kids go to 10 different schools in their 12 years of schooling.

I mean, that sort of thing just kind of goes over the head, but it doesn't mean they don't appreciate the sacrifices. It doesn't mean that they somehow see the military as an outcast of American society, which I would contend that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they did see the military as somehow the outcasts of American society. We're a long way from that.

**SEGAL:** Can I follow up on that –

**ATKINSON:** David.

**SEGAL:** – because I sort of bristle at the term “culture gap.”

I think it is clear that there's a lack of understanding, and there's an appreciation that there's a lack of understanding. But I was also impressed by how closely the attitudes of the military personnel and the veterans and the civilians actually were, and the fact that where there were differences, they were largely explained by differences in the selection process for the military – self-selection process, the fact that people who go into the military are more likely to see themselves more conservative, they are more likely to see themselves as Republicans.

And, in fact, when you control for those factors, the differences between veterans and nonveterans pretty much disappears. So, to say that there's a gap – you know, back in the 1990s there were a lot of journalists and social scientists who were saying there was a culture gap.

Yesterday in a graduate seminar I challenged my students, 15 of whom are currently serving officers, to tell me how they would know if there was a culture gap between the military and civilian society. And they couldn't come up with a good measure. They could recognize that there's a difference in perceptions, but that's different than saying there's a culture gap.

As far as the 48 percent who say they would recommend to young people close to them to join the military, I kind of wonder what occupation in the United States would come up with a higher figure. I'm pretty sure that if people ask their sons and daughters – or recommended to their sons and daughters that they go out and be sociology professors, you know, we'd be down in the single digits. (Laughter.)

I suspect that if the question was, would you recommend that your son or daughter to into law or medicine, you'd get into double digits, but I'm not sure that you'd get anywhere near 48 percent. I think that 48 percent figure is probably high relative to what other occupations might get.

**ATKINSON:** And, Paul, and I know that the figure would be in the negative numbers if we asked about journalism. (Laughter.)

**ALLEN:** Rick, about two years ago, you and I sat on a panel at Boston College in mass humanities, and there's a concern again from certain sectors of society, to include academics, that there is a disconnect between what the educators understand about the military and what society understands about the military. And that was a full one-day panel we had out in Boston, and there was a lot of concern about that.

The question is, we have our society members who are the elite and they're not involved in the process of making decisions or sacrificing their children to go into service. That concerned them. For academics who are teaching at Ivy League schools, they don't see military students in the classroom. How they connected with their students and with the greater part of society, that was a concern at a very substantial cohort two years ago.

**ATKINSON:** I mean, if you don't know this world, however you define that; if you don't know – if you have no direct experience in the military, can you make sensible civic decisions about things military? Is that a hazard, where 312 million people is a relatively small number who actually understand the nuances.

**SEGAL:** Back in the 1990s when there was a debate going on, one of the concerns was the diminishing number of people sitting in our legislative bodies who had military experience, not necessarily having been career military but having served a term in the military and walking in the shoes of soldiers. And clearly there has been a decline over time in the number of generals who sit in the Congress.

And, yeah, I think that is a concern. I think that the people who are making decisions to deploy our military forces and fund our military forces should have a sense of what deployments and military equipment means.

I see veterans as an important vehicle of civil-military relations in the United States. They're a group that weaves the military into the broader fabric of society, which is a role that we used to sort of say the conscripts do that. You know, they go into the military; they come back; they return to civilian society. Well, the veterans still do it. The Reserve components do it.

And I think one of the things that has improved civil-military relations in the current wars is that in fact we have mobilized our Reserve components and use them in their military role, not simply for domestic disasters but in fact for overseas operations, because the experience that they bring back to their communities, which frequently have nobody else in the military serving, I think helps educate their friends, their neighbors as to what is involved in the military.

**ATKINSON:** Other thoughts on this?

**MANSOOR:** Well, again, going back – our Constitution, by the way, gives authority to the commander in chief, who is a civilian, and the people who wrote the Constitution didn't have an expectation that the folks in Congress would be serving – you know, would be veterans. Some of our greatest wartime presidents have had no military service.

So, is it desirable to have folks in Congress who have a sense of what the military is all about? Absolutely. And we may get more now that we have veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan running for Congress. There's a couple. I know Representative West in Florida was in the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. There's others.

So we may have seen the low point. We'll see about that. But I don't think, again, that it should be the sine qua non of you can't make a decision regarding military affairs unless you've served in the military, because then our republic really would collapse.

**ATKINSON:** Does it become easier, though, to commit the force to combat if you don't really know what combat is about?

**MANSOOR:** I think it's a different issue, that it's easier to commit the force to combat when it's a volunteer force, because you then aren't necessarily affecting a broad swath of the American people when the body bags start to come home, and people, as they did in the survey, said, well, that's just – you signed up for that and it's part of military service, and then it does become easier in that sense.

**GREENTREE:** And it would have also been interesting to add the question of, you know, would you support a war tax, or would you support – and then list other things besides shaking hands or saying thank you in an airport to truly support the military.

**ALLEN:** Good idea, actually.

**ATKINSON:** So, should we think about the military the same way we think about the police or fire? Or is there a substantive difference in military service in terms of first responders?

Chuck?

**ALLEN:** I think there's a big difference, again, with the first responders as a day-to-day activity – expectation they're there to help and serve people, but the loss of life is probably not present – ever-present.

If you look at students now at the War College who have had 25 or so years of service, they probably have seven or eight different types of deployments both pre-9/11 and post-9/11. Folks who have enlisted in the Army since 2001 have at least two or three deployments. And with that you have this constant threat of death or injury. Even though the numbers are pretty large, that looms over them largely – pretty substantially. And then that also affects their families.

**GREENTREE:** Right. To follow up with the families, one of my fellow Blue Star family directors, we were talking beforehand, because I said, is there a difference between military families and first responders?

And I thought back to our survey results where the top issues for military families are effects of deployment on children, the military's lifestyle effect on their educational attainment, and military spouse employment. Forty-nine percent said that they had felt adverse effects for being a military spouse. And you wouldn't find that, I don't think, in other families of first responders.

So it's unique in that the sustained deployments, the amount – you know, the OPTEMPO is different. So, while there is a lot that does overlap the fear for security in life is there, but there is enough different, I think, to where it makes it a unique experience.

**ALLEN:** Right. The other part, there is a trauma associated. Again, the report said that while 50 percent witness a killing or death of a friend that were involved in some activity that they felt ashamed of, you might not have that in the fire department or local police department.

When you have this, again, involvement in conflict and the moral hazard, those things stay with you. You mentioned that up front. It stays with you, which is different than a fireman and the police department, I believe.

**ATKINSON:** David?

**SEGAL:** The family stresses are not simply a function of the current deployments and the operational tempo. They clearly have made military life more stressful, but the basic problems are there in peacetime. And a fundamental problem, for example, with adjustment of adolescents or spouse employment is in fact frequent relocation.

And we kind of lose sight of the fact that a majority of military spouses who are employed are in jobs that require credentialing of some kind, whether they're cosmetologists or dental hygienists or attorneys. And credentialing is generally a states' right issue. And if the military moves them from one state to another, either as a cosmetologist or as an attorney, they have to start again to get credentialed to practice in that state.

You know, we've done a good deal of research on military spouse employment. Military spouses, by the way, as a group are more educated than comparable spouses of civilian men, but they have higher unemployment rates, they have higher underemployment rates, they have higher rates of giving up and leaving the labor force. And then they remain employed, they get less of a return to their level of education than to civilians. The entire employment deck is stacked against them.

**ATKINSON:** And, as an Army brat, I can tell you that you can put in 18 years as a dependent and there's no damn pension. (Laughter.)

So, let me ask the two colonels, retired colonels, do veterans sufficiently recognize and acknowledge that by enlisting or accepting a commission, that they've agreed to take on most of the national burden when it comes to waging near perpetual war? Did your soldiers know that in the brigade?

**MANSOOR:** I think that soldiers do recognize that. In fact, most of them signed up knowing they could go to war. My brigade was there in one of the very early rotations, so it was still sort of new.

Having gone back in '07, '08 when some people were on their third rotation, it was wearing on them and there was a little bit of grumbling. But again, the expectation is that you're a long-service professional, and if you want to stay in, you're going to have to do these deployments.

Now, it gets to a wider national debate, during the Iraq War anyways, did we have a big enough military, because we didn't do anything to expand the force when we went into Iraq. And then we, for too long, put blinders on as to what kind of war we were in and the fact that it would be a lengthy war.

So the issue was that there just wasn't enough forces, and then we got into longer and longer deployments, eventually deployments exceeding the length of time people spent at home during the surge – 15 months overseas for 12 months at home, and it was pretty brutal.

And that leads to all sorts of stresses on the force – higher divorce rate, suicides, and other things that we saw go on. But the expectation still is if you join the military, you're joining to be a long-service professional. If you stay in, then you're going to be deployed.

**ATKINSON:** Chuck?

**ALLEN:** Well, Pete and I went to the same school many years ago, so as an academy graduate, again, we understood this profession of the arms.

I had a chance to teach at West Point back in the mid-'80s. Again, folks saw themselves coming to a calling, right: serving their nation. And now I'm teaching at the Army War College and I have students, again, that have been in service 20-some years and they're going back into the mix. They understand that they signed up for, to serve the nation, to take care of soldiers, and to be responsible stewards. So they know what it costs.

Part of the conversation is that the Army has been at war for about 10 years here pretty consistently, and folks feel that maybe the American people don't appreciate that and they haven't sacrificed. I'll submit that the soldiers that I know – officers and NCOs – don't want their American citizens to sacrifice. They signed up for this. They're trying to protect and defend. So I think they realize the burden they're going to carry, and they willingly accept it.

**ATKINSON:** David, the Pew results seem to suggest that we don't confuse the warrior with the war, as we did so frequently in Vietnam. Ninety percent-plus voice admiration for the military even when less than half support the two current wars. Why the sea change?

**SEGAL:** In a sense, we've gotten more sophisticated as a country, I think. But if you recall the results on the public evaluation of institutions, even if you go back to the Vietnam period, the military was one of the most trusted institutions. Now, back then it wasn't trusted as much as the Congress, which – I don't remember the Congress back then, but it certainly was trusted more than most other American institutions, including churches, including education.

So we have a history of trusting our military. We didn't trust it as much then. I think we have gotten more sophisticated. I think that we learned a lesson from the anti-war movement during Vietnam that – given that then our army was largely conscripts, we finally figured out that they didn't chose the wars that they fought. They fought the wars that the nation sent them to fight.

And the turning point that I saw was in fact the first Gulf War, when, for the first time, the peace movement started taking as a motto "Support our troops: Bring them home," which was

different than our soldiers are baby-killers. And that theme has persisted in the peace movement.

So there has been a sense that, yes, we have an obligation to support our soldiers – they are America’s sons and daughters – even if we don’t like the wars that they’re being sent to fight. Now, that’s an issue that we may have with the civilians who send them, but it’s not their fault.

**ATKINSON:** Vivian?

**GREENTREE:** Yes, I mean, I think it shows the professionalization of the military, where it is volunteer.

And also, I think it shows – as the veterans are using their GI Bills and going back to higher education and to universities around the country and they’re talking about their experiences, and this whole next generation that might not have had any experience with the military is seeing they fight for what’s behind them, not because of what’s in front of them, and they go to war because that’s – you know, it doesn’t matter who’s in power, who chooses, but that’s their job.

So it’s nice to see that our veterans of today are not maybe experiencing the same thing that some of our earlier veterans did.

**ATKINSON:** Let’s take questions from the floor.

Sir? Larry Korb.

**QUESTION:** Hi. My name is Larry Korb. Let me tie a couple of things together that I think are implicit in what’s been said.

First of all, during Vietnam, yes, we had conscription. It was totally unfair. The 42<sup>nd</sup> and 43<sup>rd</sup> presidents of the United States and the last two vice presidents all figured out how not to go. And that was one of the reasons why we had to end it, because even at the height of Vietnam, we only needed 1 out of 6.

Now, when the people created the voluntary military, they wanted to keep the connection with society, which is why they kept draft registration. Now, it was discontinued for a while but then was brought back by President Carter and kept by President Reagan.

The problem you have in these wars is that we did not activate the Selective Service System because the AVF – and David and I just finished an article; look it up – the Joint Chiefs of staff said it’s a peacetime force. Well, if you’re going to go to big wars and you don’t do it, then you’re going to have to deal with the things we’ve had.

You’re supposed to have two years at home for every year you’re deployed. That’s the policy we set. Why did we do it? Because you didn’t activate Selective Service. Had you done that, the American people would have asked a lot more questions about the war.

You would not have had the problems that you have for these brave men and women, you know, who serve, and you would restore that connection to society because even if you didn't take everybody, people would think that they could go. That's the failure. That is the real failure of what happens here.

**ATKINSON:** Comments?

**SEGAL:** Just to underline that – since Larry has already put in a commercial message for our recent paper, “Daedalus” – (laughter) – the Gates Commission, President Nixon's commission on the all-volunteer force, while in the first volume of the report seemed to endorse conversion to an all-volunteer force, was very clear in recognizing that this was going to be basically a peacetime deterrence force, and that if the United States were to get involved in a large-scale or protracted war, that it would revert to conscription. That's why the Selective Service System was kept in place.

And as I recall, in a footnote the definition of a protracted war was a war that required the deployment of troops or more than six months, and a large-scale war was a war that required the deployment of more than 100,000 troops. Well, we passed those milestones very quickly after we got involved in the current conflicts.

So we have been asking the volunteer force to do something it was never designed to do. The plans were that if we were to require expeditionary missions like this, we would go back to conscription. Now, the data show very clearly that the American public doesn't want to do that, but I think that if we reminded the public that this was the plan, it would at least precipitate a discussion of what wars America fights and who fights them.

**ATKINSON:** Andy?

**KOHUT:** Let me throw another piece of data at this question about the disconnect.

It's not a matter of a physical disconnect, the percentage of people who know veterans, or the small percentage of Americans who serve. What we have in this war which is distinct from other wars is it's gone off the public's radar screen.

If you look at the trend in our surveys that measure, on a weekly basis, attention to news events, both of the wars – in large numbers, Americans have forgotten about them. You wouldn't see that in the course of the Second World War, Korea or any of the other wars. This is a matter of psychology as well as proximity.

Also, I think the senator wanted to make a comment as well.

**ATKINSON:** Senator?

**FORMER SENATOR JOHN WARNER:** It's always very dangerous to get a senator up and give him a mic. (Laughter.)

I first want to say this has really been an astonishingly interesting panel discussion, and I look forward to examining this opus with great care. I'm going to be testifying before the Congress

soon. They're bringing back some of the old chairmen to give their perspectives, and I think I may quote from this report with considerable knowledge – not giving you attribution, just pretend like it was my idea. (Laughter.)

But in all seriousness – and I speak with the deepest sense of humility to my country for the benefits it gave me, for having been able to be a participant and an observer since January 1945 when, at 17, I joined the Navy. But those of us who came home from that absolutely were welcomed with open arms. Everything was given to us. I would never have gotten what little limited achievement I've had in life without the GI Bill.

My father had served in World War I as a doctor in the trenches. He was wounded and decorated. But he never, out of a sense of pride, ever accepted a dollar in compensation for his wounds, even though they nagged him until the day he died. I mean, that was the thought in the country toward people who had served.

Then in the Korean War I trotted off again, and I'll never forget when we came back. We served our tours. Mine was relatively short for various reasons. At the discharge place where we signed all our papers, had our physical, they issued the medals that you were entitled to, the service ribbons and so forth.

And then they said, you know, you'd best just put them in your suitcase together with your uniform and go out and get a pair of blue jeans and go home, because nobody really realizes where you've been and what you've done. The Korean War was called "the forgotten war" because the country never got involved.

Then along came Vietnam, and that, if I may say, was probably one of the saddest chapters of my career. I was in public service, and I saw how the public took their antagonism against the war out against the soldier, the sailor, airman and Marine in uniform. I mean, the fellows and women that had gone, done the job, came home, they took the brunt of the criticism.

From that point on, it went up to where today they are the most esteemed single group in our country. And this report I think captures that and it's well-disseminated. But I would ask – I'd make one observation and then ask one question. And thank you for indulging me for a minute.

I had a hand through the years in getting the legislation for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial with Mac Mathias and Bob Dole and others to do the World War II Memorial. Those are two of the most visited edifices in the nation's capital. Just compare their visitation with Air and Space Museum – they rank right there – White House and so forth.

So, somehow there is a respect and a curiosity latent among the American public to go and see these memorials that honor those who have served. So you might take a note of that. But my question is as follows:

It was during my final years in the Pentagon when we put together the concept for the all-volunteer force. And while I don't remember specifically how all the verbiage went out, I do remember we thought it was the biggest gamble that had ever been done by civilian control of the military. And there were many elements of the uniformed side that were very concerned

about whether it would work. But, being good soldiers, sailors, airmen and so forth, they saluted, marched off, and it worked magnificently.

My question to you is, any of the material that you've developed show any indication that there is some sentiment in the public that might change that institution, which I think has been the basic reason for the successes we've had thus far to be able to – I'm not going to argue the plusses and minuses about Iraq and Afghanistan, but indeed the public has admired what the military has done and withstood the heavy financial costs, but at some point that dike may give way. But is there anything there that questions the continuation of the concept of the magnificence of the all-volunteer force?

**ATKINSON:** Thank you, Senator Warner.

Pete, you've got something to say?

**MANSOOR:** This is in answer to Senator Warner's question and also addresses Larry Korb's concern.

On page 14 there was a question put to the survey respondents, and that is – it was actually a statement: "Do you agree that the U.S. should not return to a draft?" And 74 percent of the American people said the U.S. should not return to a draft, which is not surprising. What is surprising is that number is only exceeded by the number of post-9/11 veterans who said the U.S. should not return to a draft, and that number was 82 percent.

So why is it that the military doesn't – and the people in uniform don't want to return to a draft? Because they realize the quality within the ranks, and they don't want a bunch of draftees who might be of lower quality – invariably will be of lower quality – in the ranks with them, serving next to them, not in these kind of wars at any rate.

And so, I think – I would have to disagree.

**Q:** You gave 100,000 moral waivers to meet your quotas.

**ALLEN:** It's still a very high-quality force.

**Q:** If you had Selective Service you wouldn't – (inaudible).

**ALLEN:** The problem, I would contend – and I did contend earlier in the panel – is that we didn't expand the force. But I would also contend we can do that through volunteer means. And the senator and others in Congress have provided those means with some of the best benefit packages our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have ever experienced in the history of this nation.

So when we say the American people haven't sacrificed for the military, directly no, but through their representatives they have compensated our all-volunteer force very well. The new GI Bill is awesome – the various pays and benefits. We have the best – one of the better medical systems in the nation. So there's a lot of things that do support our forces.

**ATKINSON:** Vivian, and then there's a question back over here.

**GREENTREE:** OK. And for some of us who look at public service motivation and public administration literature, volunteers in civic engagement, if we're focusing our conversation on conscription and making people be in the military because they owe their country something or not everybody should have to go to war, that's skipping the whole step of nurturing a culture where service is appreciated in any form, not necessarily in the military.

But if you think about the way that we've been talking public service lately, the only group that has been able – of public servants – to escape kind of the bureaucrat, paper-pushing bureaucrat, is the military.

And the idea of public service in general and what that does for our country and the communitarian values that come when you volunteer, when you encourage your family to volunteer, when you see it happening in your own sphere, those are the types of – to get back from, well, we know that we do want a professional force, we do want people to volunteer because you want the person next to you to want to be there because they want to be there, not because they're made to be there.

So the answer, then, is to take a step back and stop talking about, who should we make serve, but then say – like, go back to, how can we make people want to serve and how can we nurture that culture that emphasizes service?

**ATKINSON:** David?

We'll get to you, ma'am, in just a second.

**SEGAL:** Yeah, I think there are two dimensions that have to be addressed. One is the normative basis for service and the other is the mechanism for bringing people in and, you know, balancing sort of pragmatism. I don't think there's any way we're going to go back to conscription anymore than I think we're going to go back to a racially segregated military or a gender-segregated military. You don't turn history around 180 degrees.

But when we adopted the all-volunteer force, we not only changed the mechanism for bringing people in, but by adopting a purely labor market model we set aside the normative basis for serving the common good. And I think if we could find some way to embed the all-volunteer force in a matrix of broader contributions to society – an all-volunteer Peace Corps, an all-volunteer Teach for America – and somehow developed a norm that everyone is expected to do one of these things, then I think that we would improve both the health of society and the health of the force.

**ATKINSON:** Back over here, ma'am, and then Doug Wilson has a question.

**Q:** Good afternoon. I'm just honored to be here and to listen to all of the great things and all of the research that you've presented. My name is Ethel Sligh and I'm with the Department of Veterans Affairs. And I'm proud to say that when you speak about nurturing a culture of those who have served and those – whether they volunteered or were drafted, the VA is committed to taking care of our nation's veterans.

We take great pride in the educational programs and the health care programs, and just restoring our veterans to their fullest state when they return from war. My prior position was with the Department of the Army, where I served as a guidance counselor and worked with soldiers. So I've worked with soldiers and veterans all of my career, which is 32 years.

So I am so proud of what you're doing in your research, and all of the wonderful people that are here who are supporting, in a nutshell, our nation's veterans. And I just want to thank you for your job –

**ATKINSON:** Thank you, ma'am.

**ATKINSON:** Doug Wilson.

**Q:** Thanks. My question is for you, actually. I serve as the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, and this outstanding report that Pew has done I think reflects views that a lot of people hold as a result of what they've seen on television and read in the newspaper. They're very proud of our men and women in uniform because you see, night after night, the accomplishments and the exploits on the battlefield.

And they understand that there are problems, because they see the wounded warriors, they see those who are missing limbs, and they read about it in the news and on television. But in my entire tenure at the Pentagon I have only read two articles – both of them by Greg Jaffe, both of them outstanding pieces in the Washington Post – which actually talk about how you can connect, above and beyond the baseball games where you wheel out the wounded warriors and there's fireworks and everybody applauds and you go home.

How you actually connect and communicate – his piece with regard to the young man who lost a limb and is now at Georgetown Law School and felt so isolated from his students that he himself took the initiative to do a study group once a week where he brought in young 18- and 19-year-olds who wouldn't have a clue what the military was about. To basically talk to them and share what it was he'd been through really made an impact.

How would you advise somebody like me, or how would you advise, you know, those who are likely – who are working with the press to better promote coverage like that?

**ATKINSON:** Oh, well, it's not my position to advise you, first of all – (laughter) – I hasten to add. You know, frankly, it's above your pay grade, Doug. (Laughter.) I'm serious. It starts at the top. It starts with the president – not just this president but his predecessors and those who will succeed him.

I think that it's incumbent on the leader of the nation to make every effort that he can to be sure that some of the issues that we're talking about here are not confined to the Willard Room at the Willard Hotel, that it is something that is part of the national dialogue, and that an understanding of the nuances of service and sacrifice, not just in the military but the notion – the vilification of public service outside of the military, for those of us who have lived in Washington for decades and decades, is despicable. It's important that we not get into the trap

of demonizing civil servants. I'm sure you can appreciate that at the Pentagon where you've got more than your share of them.

And, you know, other than that, one of the things that we've certainly seen in the wars of the last 20 years, starting with the Gulf War really, is lots of reporters who had no experience, really, with the military going out and getting to know Sergeant so and so or Colonel so and so or Private so and so, and getting to know who they are and what they do and how good they are at what they're doing.

And I think that that as much as anything helps to both expose journalists to this very complex, fascinating world of the military, but through them they are a conduit to the wider country.

**Q:** If I could just make one reply. I thank you for the answer, but I would respectfully say that it's very much in my pay grade and the pay grades of everybody here, because the real issue is how do you deal with awkwardness – awkwardness in communications? How do you get people to understand that it's relatively more easy to overcome awkwardness if you do it in a straightforward way, and it doesn't take a hell of a lot of time?

We're looking for those kinds of stories. My hat is off to Greg Jaffe. And if you take a look at the work of the Military Child Education Association, Blue Star Families, so many of the groups that are doing, in the communities, the work having to do with dealing with awkwardness, I think there are stories there, and I think it goes – it doesn't have to go to the very top.

**ATKINSON:** Point taken.

Yes, ma'am.

**Q:** Mary Ellen McCarthy with the staff of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs.

None of the discussion that I've heard today has talked specifically about the Guard and Reserve. And in particular, some of the comments that have been made about people signing up, knowing what they were getting into and so forth, certainly it's true now for people joining the Guard and Reserve, but at the start of the first Gulf War we had people who signed up to help their fellow citizens when there was a flood or a tornado or some local kind of thing, and suddenly they found themselves, some of them in their 40s, carrying packs when maybe a briefcase was the heaviest thing they'd carried.

And we've seen a lot of results from that. And my question is, how have you looked at that in the context both of your research and possibly what you might be looking at in the future? Thank you.

**ATKINSON:** Chuck, you've got a lot of experience with the Guard. What did you see in this report?

**ALLEN:** I think we have a case where the Guard and Reserve is just as motivated to serve as the active component. And we've realized over the past few years that we can't do the nation's mission without the Guard and Reserve, and they've accepted that wholeheartedly.

We asked this question about, is the volunteer Army a success or not? I think you have to say yes if you look at what the Army has been required to do, what the military has been required to do in the past few years. We talk about this idea of trust of the American people and trust within the organization. It is based upon three different things.

One, there's a local competence that those folks – those soldiers have, right: an ability to perform the task that's provided to them or given to them to either fight the nation's wars or respond to national disasters. They've done that in a phenomenal fashion.

The other issue is the idea of benevolence or motivation. They're doing something really in terms of service above themselves, right, with dedicating themselves to someone else in the process. And there's no question about them threatening the American society, the government, et cetera; they're doing things because of a bigger calling.

And the last one is a sense of integrity. They're operating on values and they're being true to form. And when issues come up – I know Dana Priest is in the audience. We've had her here at Carlisle. When there's a problem with veterans at Walter Reed or wounded warriors, the military has a responsibility to act to resolve that. The wounded warrior project is in place. The VA is in place. So we're taking actions.

So I think all of that process with the Guard and Reserve, they had the same challenges that we have in the active component, but we do know that when they go back to their civilian occupation, they have to kind of start again.

**GREENTREE:** And I would just add to that, the benevolence – there is a term that I came across, “the patriotism of benevolence,” and it was the way that the Danish civil servants reacted to German occupation differently than German bureaucrats did.

And so, it was the idea of extending your feelings of empathy and compassion to those who you don't know. And I always think of that in terms of our military because they are – those definitions of patriotism that they have is in serving their country and serving others that they don't even know or might not agree with or don't even particularly like.

And so, I know – I've seen it in shades of what everyone said up here, but another thing that kind of goes back to Doug's question is that when we are talking about the military or the National Guard and Reserve components, I think everybody up here has made a very big point of saying that we're proud of what we do and it's not a sense of victimhood. That's something we get sometimes with reporters who call and say, you know, can you hook me up with someone who might have tried to commit suicide but didn't? (Laughter.)

And those are the awkward questions where you want to – you want to help to share a story but you don't want them to misrepresent what we do. I mean, this report, if anything it shows that no matter the negative things that have come so far, is that we would, by far and large, suggest that our own children join the military, and we're proud of our service. And so I think that – I've seen that up here in various ways through every question that's been asked.

**ATKINSON:** David?

**SEGAL:** Yeah. Clearly, when we went to war 10 years ago, there were people in the Guard who had signed up with an expectation that they would serve one weekend a month, two weeks during the summer, and be called up by the governor in case of natural disaster, and we sent them to war.

And one of my favorite photographs of that period is a National Guard Humvee covered with dust in Iraq, with somebody having written in the dust, "One weekend a month, two weeks during the summer. Bullshit." (Laughter.) But the fact is that that National Guard unit went.

And on top of that, now that it's clear that the National Guard is going to be used in foreign deployments, people have continued to join the Guard. I agree that there is very little difference in the motivations of people who serve in the Guard and Reserve and people who serve in the active forces. The major differences are in terms of their life circumstances. Some people can do it and some people can't.

In the mid-1990s, I was working with the Army chief of staff. We were beginning to experiment with using National Guard troops in peacekeeping missions overseas, something that we had not used Guard troops for. In fact, we were trying them out in the Sinai Multinational Force & Observers, which until that point had been a mission assigned to the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps.

And we had been juggling troops – battalions from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, you know, the pointy end of our active duty spear. And we said, let's see if the National Guard can do this. And we had no trouble getting volunteers from the Guard who, in the mid-'90s had volunteered to serve one weekend a month and two weeks during the summer, but given an opportunity to support American foreign policy as part of a military force overseas, they said – you know, they raised their hands, said, let's go.

So that piece of the equation is working, which reaffirms my faith in the citizen soldier as an important component of the normative system of the American military.

**ATKINSON:** Pete has a quick point, and then back here, sir, in front of Dana.

**MANSOOR:** Yeah, I completely agree with what David said.

One more piece of sort of insight: Based on the way the forces were configured going into the wars of 9/11, a lot of the capabilities that we needed to fight wars of counterinsurgency were embedded in the Guard and Reserve, and so we had no choice but to deploy them. Civil Affairs brigades would be a good example.

And if these are the kind of wars we're going to fight in the future, then the mix of active and reserve forces needs to be addressed. But that's just something that we had no choice in some cases but to use the Guard over and over and over again because that's where the capability resided, or the Reserves.

**ALLEN:** I think the biggest point is that they responded to the challenge even though they weren't designed to do the long deployments or repeated deployments. Again, service above self, and they moved out and did a great job for us.

**ATKINSON:** Sir?

**Q:** Thanks. I'm Rudy deLeon from the Center for American Progress. I used to work at the Pentagon and on the Hill.

Is there data – and Vivian made a very important comment, and that is we're talking largely about the sacrifices of the men and women who serve in the all-volunteer force. Is there anything in the data – or perhaps it can be a series of questions for the follow-on Pew report – which would state what are reasonable expectations to ask of the general population that benefits from the security the 1 percent deploys?

It's a political rail to say that you should pay as you go, but in an all-volunteer force and then the new mechanism of off-budget supplemental appropriations, there really isn't a forcing mechanism for the Congress or for the American dinner table to talk about these wars once they start.

So I wonder if the data asked any of those questions or whether, in the next report, topics of what we should ask the American population in return what sacrifices are they prepared to make before we deploy the troops to a 10-year war?

**ATKINSON:** Anybody have a response to that, or should we kick it to Paul?

**TAYLOR:** Not in the initial report, but very good question, and we will take it into account.

**GREENTREE:** Every yellow ribbon bumper sticker should go \$10 to the VA. (Laughter.)

**SEGAL:** Can I say something, Rick?

**ATKINSON:** Sure.

**SEGAL:** One of the unique things about these wars is this is really the first time, certainly in my recollection, that we have gone to war and not asked the public to sacrifice in some way, and the sacrifices weren't just being the parents of the men and women who went to war. In past wars we've imposed special taxes, we've rationed people, we've pushed them buy war bonds. There was a clear manifestation of a request that they do something.

For the current wars, first of all, we initially didn't define them as wars. When the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked, the government's first response was to say a crime had been committed against American society. And that was in keeping with our history. We've always regarded terrorism as a criminal act rather than an act of war. And it took us some time to decide that, yeah, this is a war.

But in the meantime, the administration had said, you know, they're attacking our economy. What we need to do is go out and shop; you know, keep the economy going. So, you know, basically the Army went to war and the public went to Wal-Mart. And we did not ask the public to sacrifice.

Now, you don't have to go back to conscription to remind the public that war costs something, and that if they want the protection of a deployed military, if they want to support an expeditionary force – and we're one of the few countries in the world that in fact have an expeditionary military that's expected to serve beyond its national borders on a regular basis, it's going to cost something.

And, like a discussion on conscription, that would stimulate, I think, a discussion in the public about what kind of military do we want and what kinds of missions do we want to be sent on?

**ATKINSON:** All right, we've got time for one more question.

Sir?

**Q:** I have a quick question and I have a comment to – I have a quick question and I have a comment to you and the gentlemen right here, who are both on point.

Here's the deal: I think it should have been Selective Service. If we knew this war would be as long as it is, we should have had Selective Service. As an infantryman, I was I was totally against Selective Service because it takes at least six months to train up to go into Iraq and Afghanistan. I didn't want a new-timer coming in green, causing more havoc and more death to my guys, all right?

First of all, I'm Charles Eggleston. I'm in Blue Star Families. I'm a wounded warrior. I spent three-and-a-half years, 56 surgeries, in Walter Reed. And I'm still going for treatment at Walter Reed, so that's why I'm dressed like this. I just came from the hospital over here just to be a part of this great, you know, conference.

Secondly, I don't see anything talking about the GWOT Chapter 61 soldiers, all right – talking about the GWOT Chapter 61 Global War on Terrorism wounded warriors coming back jobless. We're getting smacked around with – encapsulated at Bethesda. We're encapsulated at Belvoir. We're encapsulated by both. And we're encapsulated at – (inaudible). How do you want us to get out and really get a job? (Inaudible) – I mean, you know, Chapter 61 soldier.

And, of course, when I went to the VA – I'm 100 percent. As a matter of fact, my rate was at 430 percent now, so it makes me 100 percent total and permanent. They killed my honorary retirement. If I'd have stayed at 90 percent I'd get my honorary retirement as well as my VA retirement. That's a stimulus you guys need to be working forward with, because –

I do a lot of rehab through the golf – you know, through the game of golf. That's MGA, the Military Golf Association, that learned to play the game. The combat – well, my TBI, my PTS, and my wounds from my head all the way down through my leg, you know, prosthetics that I have.

What are you guys doing to combat that so Congress – you know, and my favorite friend, Senator Warner – I'm a Richmond guy so, you know, me and him used to talk when I used to come over to the Capitol. We had great conversations about such.

I'd like to see you guys engage these guys and give these soldiers, returning veterans, their just due, and stop talking about the seamless transition. I've been there. It's like three miles. So if that's a seamless transition, show me the regular transition, which must be from here to the moon.

**ATKINSON:** All right, thanks a lot. That's very much for that. (Applause.)

Pete, do you have anything? You're the reigning most recent combat commander here.

**MANSOOR:** Well, I would say that this is a research report and not a policy prescription. And there are some things in it that do address unemployment among veterans. It doesn't address unemployment – I don't think it addresses unemployment among wounded veterans, but it's invariably much, much higher. But among veterans as a whole, they have fared much worse than American society as a whole in this recession.

Having said that, though, the report also says that veterans believe that military service has given them better tools, better experiences and job skills that will help them in the future. How that applies to wounded veterans, you know, you've got me there, because I just – I have never walked in your shoes. But I think that's a great, maybe, follow-on to add to the next study.

**ALLEN:** I think another piece of this is that we've seen, I think, with the transition from active service to reserve service and retirement, that we have about a 2 percent higher unemployment rate with veterans. So if we're 9 percent across the nation now, we're about 11.5 percent for active component personnel that leave the service.

And if you look at the minority distribution of the force – again, 30 percent of the force is also a minority – they also have a higher unemployment rate in our nation. That's one thing we haven't talked about.

We've talked about homeless population: 79,000 veterans are homeless right now. About 50 percent have some mental health issues. You saw the chart there. And about 70 percent have substance abuse problems that may be related to their combat service.

So you have all these issues that are out there. Like 22,000-some families are at risk for homelessness because of veteran issues and concerns in their families. This transition to society is not seamless and is hard, and there is a need to look at it, pay attention to it, and kind of work through the issues for our service members.

**GREENTREE:** And I'd just add, and this is one area where the larger society can get involved, where we can involve the public and the private and the nonprofit agencies for hiring veterans. And I know that that's already been doing – done in a lot of areas under the Joint Forces Initiative, with the Chamber of Commerce, with the Department of Labor and individual state and local chambers of commerce

But this is a great way to – not because they owe it to veterans or because they're our charity cases, but because they have skill sets that people want and, quite frankly, need in their organizations.

And so that's one area, when we're talking about closing if there is a divide or not, but this would be – veterans employment is one of the areas where we could all work together private, public and nonprofit.

**ATKINSON:** Oh behalf of Pew and the four panelists up here, I want to thank you for showing your interest in this very important subject by showing up today. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

**-END-**